Beyond Politics: From Party Bundles to a Civic Framework That Works
Big Nose Knows… governance
Beyond Politics: From Party Bundles to a Civic Framework That Works
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1) The problem with bundle politics
Traditional systems force citizens to pick a side, then accept policies they never endorsed. Governing becomes a contest for control rather than a public service that turns citizen input into working law.
Problem framing
Party bundles amplify tribal identity and zero-sum incentives; opposition is treated as enemy territory; and “winning” eclipses problem-solving.
Party bundles amplify tribal identity and zero-sum incentives; opposition is treated as enemy territory; and “winning” eclipses problem-solving.
2) What the evidence says
OECD review Independent syntheses document 100+ institutionalized deliberative mini-publics (citizens’ assemblies/juries) delivering workable recommendations when mandates and follow-through are clear.[1]
Comparative politics Consensus and coalition-oriented democracies correlate with more inclusive, negotiated outcomes than winner-take-all systems.[2]
100+institutionalized deliberative processes catalogued globally
60%consensus thresholds reduce “bare majority” swings
24/7digital participation possible when tied to real procedures
3) Case studies: where it worked
Ireland: Assemblies → Referendums → Constitutional change
Marriage equality (2015) and abortion law reform (2018) followed citizens’ assemblies with expert testimony and neutral information campaigns. Recommendations advanced to binding national votes that passed—and amended the constitution.[3]
Lesson: Bind the pipeline: recommendation → draft → referendum (or guaranteed legislative vote). Fund public information so voters decide on the merits.[4]
Taiwan: Digital consensus that shaped rules
Through vTaiwan and the civic-tech community g0v, online deliberations (e.g., Pol.is) clustered agreement on platform-economy issues (like ride-sharing). Agencies reported back and incorporated outputs into regulation.[5]
Lesson: Digital works when government commits to translate results into drafts and publish responses.[6]
Switzerland: Continuous direct votes
Popular initiatives and referendums give citizens routine, binding control over laws. Lawmakers remain responsive—provided rights guardrails and campaign-finance rules are in place.[7]
Belgium (Ostbelgien): Permanent citizens’ council
The German-speaking Community created a standing Citizens’ Council that regularly convenes assemblies and ensures parliamentary follow-through—turning participation from a one-off event into an institution.[8]
Oregon (USA): Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR)
Randomly selected panels study ballot measures and write a one-page statement mailed to every voter. Studies show improved voter knowledge and efficacy.[9]
Participatory Budgeting: Porto Alegre → Cascais
Porto Alegre pioneered PB; it improved local priorities but waned with shifting politics. Cascais (Portugal) scaled PB and sustained it with strong mayoral backing and budget guarantees.[10]
New Zealand: Ending winner-take-all with MMP
A Royal Commission informed the shift to Mixed-Member Proportional via referendum (1993). Results: more parties, coalition governments, and dampened zero-sum dynamics.[11]
4) Where things failed—and why
- Iceland’s crowd-drafted constitution: Innovative process, but no binding route to adoption. Design miss: no hard link from deliberation to ratification.[12]
- France’s Climate Convention: 149 proposals; many diluted during lawmaking. Design miss: weak commitment and cherry-picking.[13]
- BC & Ontario electoral reform referendums: Citizens’ assemblies recommended change; high thresholds and thin voter education sank it. Design miss: unrealistic supermajorities + poor public info.[14]
- Madrid’s Decide platform: Scaled input without durable, cross-party institutional backing. Design miss: participation without teeth.[15]
- California propositions: Interest-group spending and ballot complexity. Design miss: money-in-politics + cognitive overload.[16]
- Swiss rights risk: The minaret ban referendum highlighted majoritarian overreach. Design miss: insufficient rights backstops.[17]
5) Design principles that separate success from failure
- Bind the pipeline. Recommendations must automatically proceed to a guaranteed parliamentary vote or referendum within a fixed window.[4]
- Fund public understanding. Mail a neutral voter guide; consider a CIR-style one-pager.[9]
- Protect rights explicitly. A constitutional rights charter + judicial review prevents majoritarian harm.[17]
- Institutionalize permanence. Standing councils and budgets avoid “pilot fatigue.”[8]
- Close the loop online. Agencies must publish how digital inputs changed draft text.[6]
- Align incentives to consensus. Use proportional/consensus rules so negotiation beats grandstanding.[2]
6) A legal model you can implement
Input Layer
- Permanent Citizens’ Council sets agendas; Citizens’ Assemblies deliberate with experts.[8]
- Digital Policy Lab (Pol.is-style) runs in parallel for mass input.[5]
- Statute: Outputs from either path must enter drafting within 60–90 days.
Drafting & Tests
- Independent Drafting Office prepares a bill + plain-English impact note.
- Rights/Cost/Impact panels publish pass-fail checklists (constitutional, fiscal, environmental).
Ratification
- Hybrid Chamber (half elected, half sortition) votes at a 60% consensus threshold.
- If it fails, trigger a binding referendum with a CIR-style voter guide.[9]
Implementation & Oversight
- Independent civil service executes.
- Citizen Oversight Panels audit outcomes annually; underperforming laws auto-queue for renewal (“patch”).[8]
Guardrails
- Rights Charter (hard floor).
- Lobbying transparency and spending caps for ballot campaigns.[16]
7) Honest limits & risks
8) The Big Nose take
Big Nose Knows… if we design governance like an engine—with intake, compression, ignition, and exhaust—we’ll fight fewer tribal battles and fix more real problems.
The pieces already exist: Ireland’s assembly→referendum pipeline, Taiwan’s digital consensus tools, Ostbelgien’s permanent council, Oregon’s voter guides, and New Zealand’s proportional rules. Where pilots failed, the reason wasn’t “citizens can’t govern”—it was missing bind-to-law pathways, weak rights protection, money drowning deliberation, or a loss of political will. The fix is design.
Notes & footnotes
- OECD. Catching the Deliberative Wave (Paris: OECD, 2020); and OECD, Eight Ways to Institutionalise Deliberative Democracy (2021). ↩︎
- Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). ↩︎
- David Farrell et al., “Deliberative Mini-Publics and Referendums: The Irish Experience,” various reports from the Irish Constitutional Convention (2012–14) and Citizens’ Assembly (2016–18). ↩︎
- Jane Suiter and David Farrell, “The Irish Citizens’ Assembly: A Case Study,” in OECD, Catching the Deliberative Wave (2020). ↩︎
- Taiwan’s vTaiwan/g0v case studies; see Audrey Tang, “Digital Social Innovation in Taiwan,” and Pol.is documentation on Uber/ride-sharing deliberations. ↩︎
- Hélène Landemore and Alexander Guerrero (eds.), Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), chapters on online deliberation and institutional binding. ↩︎
- Swiss Federal Chancellery, guides on popular initiatives and referendums; see also Wolf Linder and Sean Mueller, Swiss Democracy, 3rd ed. (Cham: Springer, 2021). ↩︎
- German-speaking Community of Belgium (Ostbelgien), decree establishing the Citizens’ Council (2019); see also OECD (2020) cases. ↩︎
- John Gastil and Katherine R. Knobloch, Hope for Democracy: How Citizens Can Bring Reason Back into Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) — on Oregon’s Citizens’ Initiative Review. ↩︎
- Brian Wampler, Participatory Budgeting in Brazil (University Park: Penn State Press, 2007); and case notes on Cascais PB (Municipality of Cascais, annual reports). ↩︎
- Royal Commission on the Electoral System, Towards a Better Democracy (Wellington, 1986); Jack Vowles et al., Voter’s Victory? (Auckland University Press, 1998) on the 1993 MMP referendum and aftermath. ↩︎
- Hélène Landemore, “Inclusive Constitution-Making: The Icelandic Experiment,” Journal of Political Philosophy 23, no. 2 (2015): 166–191. ↩︎
- Lucie Giraudet et al., “The French Citizens’ Convention for Climate: A Deliberative Democracy Experiment,” Nature Climate Change 11 (2021): 451–455; plus follow-up assessments on policy uptake. ↩︎
- Reports on the British Columbia (2005, 2009) and Ontario (2007) electoral reform referendums: thresholds, campaign education, and outcomes (BC Citizens’ Assembly; Elections BC; Elections Ontario post-mortems). ↩︎
- Assessments of Madrid’s Decide platform (2015–2019) in comparative civic-tech literature; see, e.g., TI Madrid and academic evaluations on institutional adoption. ↩︎
- Elisabeth R. Gerber, The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); updates on spending trends in California ballot measures. ↩︎
- European and UN human-rights commentary on the Swiss 2009 minaret ban; see also Linder & Mueller, Swiss Democracy, ch. on rights constraints. ↩︎
References (Chicago style)
Farrell, David M., and Jane Suiter. “The Irish Citizens’ Assembly: A Case Study.” In Catching the Deliberative Wave, OECD, 2020.
Gastil, John, and Katherine R. Knobloch. Hope for Democracy: How Citizens Can Bring Reason Back into Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
Gerber, Elisabeth R. The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Giraudet, Lucie-A., et al. “The French Citizens’ Convention for Climate: A Deliberative Democracy Experiment.” Nature Climate Change 11 (2021): 451–455.
Landemore, Hélène. “Inclusive Constitution-Making: The Icelandic Experiment.” Journal of Political Philosophy 23, no. 2 (2015): 166–191.
Landemore, Hélène, and Alexander Guerrero, eds. Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.
Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012.
Linder, Wolf, and Sean Mueller. Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies. 3rd ed. Cham: Springer, 2021.
Municipality of Cascais. Participatory Budgeting Annual Reports. Cascais, various years.
OECD. Catching the Deliberative Wave. Paris: OECD, 2020.
OECD. Eight Ways to Institutionalise Deliberative Democracy. Paris: OECD, 2021.
Royal Commission on the Electoral System. Towards a Better Democracy. Wellington, 1986.
Vowles, Jack, et al. Voter’s Victory? New Zealand’s First Election Under Proportional Representation. Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998.
Wampler, Brian. Participatory Budgeting in Brazil. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007.